Two operators’ own planning documents budget 2β3Γ the market rate for a new brand’s first 8β12 weeks. The penalty runs across the whole funnel, not just CPA.
Kazakhstan: +100β200% above benchmark. Russia: +150β250%. A second, independently built document’s own cost model runs a median 2.0Γ its cited benchmark across twelve markets. Every figure below is pre-launch planning data: a benchmark, a target, or a model the operator built before spending. None of it is confirmed post-launch spend.
Methodology
Two operators, pre-launch strategy documents, current (2025β2026):
- Operator A: multi-region crypto-only casino/slots launch. Scored twelve candidate markets on a weighted formula: 0.25Γ CAC + 0.25Γ LTV + 0.20Γ payback + 0.30Γ entry difficulty. A thirteenth candidate, Belarus, was audited but excluded before scoring.
- Operator B: CIS sportsbook + casino relaunch, RU/KZ core.
Not post-launch actuals: nothing above is confirmed spend. Not statistically representative: sixteen market-level observations (four phased, twelve modelled) from two documents, different methods and definitions, not a strict replication of one figure. Not independently audited: every figure traces to the operator’s own document, which itself cites third-party affiliate-network data (CPA.RIP, Affstar, and similar) of varying recency. Not internally reconciled: four markets carry two benchmark figures, two markets carry two internal targets, both shown, labeled by section, neither picked. Currency mixed (USD/EUR), not normalized.
Anonymized throughout: no brand names, license jurisdictions, or named individuals.
The Phased Plan
Operator B’s launch plan (Β§8.2) states a ramp-period CPA, a scale threshold, and an internal target for four markets, against the market rate it planned from:
| Market | Phase 1 CPA (ramp) | Phase 2 CPA (scale threshold) | Internal target | Market rate (Β§8.2) | Premium |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | $60β120 | $40β70 | β€$40 | $30β70 | +100β200% |
| Russia | $90β180 | $60β110 | β€$60 | $35β90 (PIN-UP from $40, Royal Partners to $90) | +150β250% |
| Uzbekistan | $40β90 | β€$35 | β | $20β50 | premium (unquantified) |
| Azerbaijan | $50β100 | β€$40 | β | $25β60 | premium (unquantified) |
Uzbekistan’s and Azerbaijan’s Phase 2 figures are labeled ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ³ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΡΠ°Π±ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ (“scale-up threshold”) in the source, not a stated target, unlike Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s.
Stop-loss: Kazakhstan halts scaling above $150 CPA for two consecutive weeks. Russia halts above $200, no time qualifier stated in the source.
The penalty isn’t confined to CPA:
| Funnel metric | Kazakhstan (ramp) | Russia (ramp) |
|---|---|---|
| Registration β FTD | 8β14% (market 15β30%; new brand loses 40β50%) | 5β9% (market 8β18%) |
| D30 retention | 10β16% (target β₯24%; second-tier industry 20β28%) | 8β13% (target β₯18%) |
| D30 churn | 65β78% (target β€55%) | 70β82% (target β€60%) |
| Payment success | 65β75% (target β₯85%) | 45β58% (target β₯72%) |
| D90 LTV | $75β325 (target β₯$200) | $113β810 (target β₯$300) |
| Affiliate share of FTD | 10β20% (target β₯50%) | 8β15% (target β₯50%) |
| Average deposit | $6β12 (market $6β22; target β₯$15) | β |
Three mechanisms named in the source explain part of the gap, independent of either operator:
- Affiliates price in a margin for unknown conversion. A network can quote an established brand a rate because it has performance history to price against. It can’t do that for a brand it’s never run traffic to.
- Paid social needs a signal-training period. Meta specifically: 2β3 weeks before cost-per-outcome stabilizes, regardless of creative quality.
- The first 7β30 days of a CIS campaign are unprofitable by design. Payback is expected at D30βD90, not launch week.
Cost and Viability, Twelve Markets
Operator A’s dossier models its own expected CAC against the benchmark CPA it cites, plus LTV, LTV/CAC, payback, and an entry-difficulty score, for the same twelve markets. Sorted by LTV/CAC:
| Market | Modelled CAC (Γ benchmark) | LTV | LTV/CAC | Payback | Entry difficulty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | $90β120 (2.3Γ) | ~$300 | 2.9Γ | 4β5 mo | 4/10 |
| Brazil | $110β145 (1.7Γ) | ~$350 | 2.8Γ | 4β5 mo | 7/10 |
| India | $70β90 (2.0Γ) | ~$200 | 2.5Γ | 4β6 mo | 7/10 + criminal risk |
| Russia | $100β130 (3.1Γ) | ~$250 | 2.2Γ | 5β6 mo | 6/10 |
| Bulgaria | $130β170 (1.4Γ) | ~$250 | 1.7Γ | 7β9 mo | 5/10 |
| Kazakhstan | $80β105 (6.2Γ) | ~$150 | 1.6Γ | 7β8 mo | 4/10 |
| Poland | $160β210 (1.6Γ) | ~$300 | 1.6Γ | 7β8 mo | 5/10 |
| Hungary | $140β180 (2.1Γ) | ~$250 | 1.6Γ | 7β9 mo | 7/10 |
| Norway | $450β500 (1.8Γ) | ~$700 | 1.5Γ | 8β9 mo | 9/10 |
| Finland | $420β450 (2.0Γ) | ~$500 | 1.1Γ | 10β11 mo | 8/10 |
| Germany | $550β580 (1.9Γ) | ~$600 | 1.1Γ | 11β12 mo | 9/10 |
| Austria | $480β500 (2.2Γ) | ~$500 | 1.0Γ | 12 mo | 8/10 |
Median CAC: 2.0Γ benchmark.
Cheap CAC and good economics are different rankings. Kazakhstan is second-cheapest by CAC and sixth by LTV/CAC return. Argentina is third-cheapest by CAC and first by return. Norway has the highest LTV in the set and the second-worst payback.
Kazakhstan’s 6.2Γ compares $80β105 modelled CAC against Operator A’s own $10β20 benchmark. Against Operator B’s independently sourced $30β70 (Β§8.2) for the same market, the same modelled cost is ~1.5β2Γ, in line with the rest of the table. Likely a benchmark disagreement between the two operators, not a modelling anomaly.
Four caveats:
- CAC is defined as cost per FTD with a crypto deposit, narrower than a generic FTD. Part of the multiple reflects that qualifier, not a new-brand effect alone.
- Austria and Germany compare a EUR benchmark against a USD-modelled CAC, unconverted in the source.
- LTV is estimated from purchasing power, crypto adoption, and industry benchmarks ($150β800 over 6β12 months per Β§2.1), not directly measured.
- The entry-difficulty score is stated as weight-sensitive and meaningful at tier level, not by individual point (Β§1.3).
The Index: 15 Markets
Four markets (Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan) carry two market-benchmark figures: Β§2.2 (early audit) and Β§8.2 (phased plan), consistently higher. Kazakhstan and Russia carry two internal targets (Β§6.4, Β§8.2). Both shown, labeled, not reconciled. The source doesn’t say which is authoritative.
| Market | Market benchmark (CPA/FTD) | Operator’s internal target | Affiliate offer (RevShare / CPA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uzbekistan | $10β25 (B Β§2.2) / $20β50 (B Β§8.2) | β | β |
| Kazakhstan | $10β20 (A) / $20β40 (B Β§2.2) / $30β70 (B Β§8.2) | β€$30 (B Β§6.4) / β€$40 (B Β§8.2) | RevShare 45β50% + CPA $25β35 (B) |
| Azerbaijan | $15β35 (B Β§2.2) / $25β60 (B Β§8.2) | β | β |
| Russia | $25β50 (A) / $25β50 (B Β§2.2) / $35β90 (B Β§8.2: PIN-UP from $40, Royal Partners to $90) | β€$45 (B Β§6.4) / β€$60 (B Β§8.2) | RevShare 45β50% + CPA $30β45 (B) |
| Belarus | $10β20 (A): unusable for an offshore operator without a Belarusian licence | β | β |
| Argentina | $30β60 (A) | β | β |
| India | $20β60 (A) | β | β |
| Brazil | $50β100 (A) | β | β |
| Hungary | $50β100 (A, operator’s own estimate; no direct market data cited) | β | β |
| Bulgaria | $60β150 (A) | β | β |
| Poland | $80β150 (A, crypto segment) | β | β |
| Finland | $150β280 (A) | β | β |
| Austria | β¬150β300 (A) | β | β |
| Norway | $180β350 (A) | β | β |
| Germany | β¬200β400 (A) | β | β |
Belarus benchmarks cheapest in the table. The source reports conversion there as low, for that profile specifically, because of payment-rail blocks. A cheap CPA on a payment rail that doesn’t reliably convert isn’t a cheap market. Licensed operators already established in Belarus are a different case.
Spread: ~15β20Γ between cheapest and most expensive on the Β§2.2 figures. On the Β§8.2 figures for the same two cheap markets (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan), the spread compresses to ~6β9Γ. The same document states both.
For Planning
- Budget the ramp period separately from steady state. The multiplier is market-specific, not a constant to copy between markets.
- Budget for the whole funnel degrading, not only CPA. RegistrationβFTD conversion, retention, churn, payment success, and LTV all ran below target in the one plan detailed enough to check.
- Set stop-loss thresholds before launch, with an explicit response attached. A ceiling with no predefined action isn’t a control.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
No. Every figure is pre-launch planning data: a benchmark, a target, or a model. None of it is confirmed post-launch spend.
Two documents put a number on it, market by market: Operator B’s phased plan (+100β200% Kazakhstan, +150β250% Russia) and Operator A’s modelled CAC (median 2.0Γ benchmark across twelve markets). Neither fully explains why on its own. Together they point at three mechanisms: affiliate margin for unknown conversion, ad-platform signal-training, and early-campaign unprofitability by design.
Depends which of two benchmark sets. On Β§2.2: roughly 15β20Γ (Uzbekistan/Kazakhstan to Germany). On Β§8.2, for the same two cheap markets: roughly 6β9Γ. The source states both.
Not for an offshore operator entering without a Belarusian licence. Belarus benchmarks at $10β20, cheapest in the table, but the source reports low conversion there for that profile, due to payment-rail blocks. Licensed operators already established in Belarus are a different case.
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